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A central challenge for international financial regulatory systems today
is how to manage the impact of global systemically important financial
institutions (G-SIFIs) on the global economy, given the interconnected
and pluralistic nature of regulatory regimes. This paper focuses on the
Financial Stability Board (FSB) and proposes a new research agenda
for the FSB’s emerging regulatory forms. In particular, it examines the
regulatory architecture of the New Governance (NG), a variety of
approaches that are supposed to be more reflexive, collaborative, and
experimental than traditional forms of governance. A preliminary conclu-
sion is that NG tools may be eﬀective in resolving some kinds of problems
in a pluralistic regulatory order, but they are unlikely to be suitable for all
problems. As such, this article proposes that analyses of the precise condi-
tions in which NG mechanisms may or may not be eﬀective are necessary.
It concludes with some recommendations for improving the NG model.
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I. Introduction
The central transnational regulatory challenge of the moment is how to monitor and
manage large cross-border institutions that can jeopardize the health of the entire global
economy. So-called global systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs) are
cross-border institutions that are so large or interconnected with other financial insti-
tutions that they are potentially “too big to fail.” Equally importantly, such institutions
are subject to multiple, overlapping, and even sometimes conflicting legal regimes.
From a legal point of view, the challenge G-SIFIs pose to global financial regulation
is the problem of the interdependence of regulatory regimes in a global system that
is inherently pluralistic in nature. The threat of regulatory arbitrage that underlies
much of the push for the harmonization of financial regulation—the threat of a race
to the bottom among jurisdictions—is plausible only if legal regimes are suﬃciently
fungible and interconnected on the one hand, and yet suﬃciently diﬀerent in regula-
tory substance or approach on the other, that in some circumstances they can become
viable alternatives from market participants’ point of view. Conversely, where markets
are interconnected, one approach to regulatory oversight in one jurisdiction produces
externalities in other regulatory regimes.
This paper takes stock of the way the international financial regulatory system
is now tackling this challenge as exemplified by the initiatives of one of the prime
organs of global financial regulation today, the Financial Stability Board (FSB). (See
Griﬃth-Jones, Helleiner, andWoods [2010].) The Group of 20 (G20) launched the FSB
as its technocratic arm of policy creation and implementation in 2009,1 transforming
an earlier Group of Seven (G7) institution, the Financial Stability Forum, into a more
robust organization with increased membership, increased institutional capacity
(increased permanent secretariat staﬀ, standing committees) and a broadened mandate
to take a more macroprudential focus on G-SIFIs in particular.2
Article 1 of the FSB’s charter emphasizes its core functions and methodologies—
coordination, standard-setting, implementation of global standards, and identification
and assessment of cross-border financial risks:
The Financial Stability Board (FSB) is established to coordinate at the inter-
national level the work of national financial authorities and international
......................................................................................
1. G20 London Summit, April 2, 2009, “Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System.”
2. Structurally, the FSB consists of a plenary of representatives of regulators, central banks and finance ministries
in member jurisdictions and international organizations, which makes decisions by consensus, including
approving peer review reports and choosing new members; a steering committee; a secretariat; and three
standing committees, one of which (the Standing Committee on Standards Implementation) is responsible for
conducting peer reviews (described further below). Agreements are negotiated in individual committees through
the circulation of draft text usually produced first by the secretariat.
Member jurisdictions are allowed one, two, or three voting participants depending on “the size of the
national economy, financial market activity and national financial stability arrangements of the corresponding
Member jurisdiction” (FSB Charter Article 10). At present, there are 24 member jurisdictions plus the Bank
for International Settlements, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the Committee
on the Global Financial System (CGFS), the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), the Inter-
national Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO), and the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) (FSB Charter Appendix A).
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standard setting bodies (SSBs) in order to develop and promote the implemen-
tation of eﬀective regulatory, supervisory and other financial sector policies.
In collaboration with the international financial institutions, the FSB will
address vulnerabilities aﬀecting financial systems in the interest of global
financial stability.3
One cannot but be impressed with the sheer volume of initiatives the FSB has
undertaken since its relaunch in 2009, and by the remarkable leadership, energy, and
acumen behind these. In this paper, I take the FSB as a target of critical analysis
precisely because it represents arguably the state of the art in international financial
governance: it is an experimental, purposeful, and energetic institution that deploys the
most innovative international financial regulation methodology today.
The FSB’s approach, like that of most domestic and international regulators, is to
tackle discrete and pressing problems through tailored policy initiatives: for example,
determining which banks should be designated as G-SIFIs, drafting rules on executive
compensation, or deciding how much and what kind of capital such banks should be
required to set aside. These are important and complex questions that leave little time
for an “eagle’s-eye view” of all of this activity taken as a whole. And yet, built into
the structure of the Basel Accords and of the numerous activities of the FSB, there
nevertheless is an inchoate but distinct ambition that this activity will ultimately add
up to a larger global financial governance project, something more than the sum of
the parts.
Thus, it is important to carefully consider the sum of all these parts, to reflect
on where this broad flurry of activity is leading, and to evaluate whether the implied
target of these activities is suﬃcient to prevent or abate financial crises to come. The
question of regulatory form—of the nature, strengths, and weaknesses of the emerging
global financial architecture—remains surprisingly underexamined both by academics
and by policymakers. For example, to date, the FSB has never clearly articulated, let
alone defended, its model of regulatory form—what I will call the New Governance
(NG) architecture.
To date, the academic literature has also not done a suﬃcient job of providing
leadership in addressing these larger questions. Academic experts in financial regu-
lation, perhaps because they are so closely engaged in conversation with policymakers,
have tended to approach problems in international financial governance at a more
granular, policy-by-policy level, without regard for the larger architecture. These
experts have focused on pointing out the strengths or shortcomings of particular policy
initiatives and have assumed that international coordination will take care of itself.4
In many cases, academics implicitly accept and even build oﬀ of the FSB model seem-
ingly without noticing the choice, or discussing its implications (e.g., Romano [2012]).
If one reads this literature as a whole for what it might tell us about the larger questions
......................................................................................
3. Financial Stability Board (2009a).
4. Gordon andMayer (2011), for example, argue for the harmonization of regulation that impacts on systemic risks
such as capital requirements, bail-ins, and so on, without discussing the mechanism by which harmonization
should take place.
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addressed in this paper, however, these specific inquiries into discrete policy initiatives
raise questions about the NG architecture.
From another disciplinary perspective, there are those working on international
law and governance, principally in fields of nonfinancial law such as international
labor law, international environmental law, and public international law, who applaud
the emerging structure of global financial regulation (Miyano [2008])—largely because
this structure has been borrowed (possibly without suﬃcient reflection) from innova-
tions in many of the public law fields in which they work. These proponents, however,
generally lack extensive expertise in financial law, and thus their analyses of the
specifics of the global financial regulatory architecture remain thin. And yet the com-
parison with other legal fields is not entirely misplaced: the entanglement of regulatory
systems is a problem that global financial regulation shares with a host of other major
international regulatory areas, from environmental regulation, to counterterrorism, and
many more. This challenge has been discussed extensively in the public international
law literature (Twining [2003]).
We know that regulatory architecture—the form regulation takes—rules versus
standards, hard law versus soft law, penalties versus rewards, ex ante versus ex post
regulation, administrative, judicial, or legislative rule-making—impacts the eﬃcacy
of regulatory initiatives, the legitimacy of regulation, and its distributive eﬀects. For
example, self-regulation is a regulatory architecture that was once taken for granted
by many as the best way of achieving certain regulatory objectives, and yet it is widely
acknowledged today that self-regulation has clear limitations. Indeed, the understanding
that regulatory architecture matters is precisely the premise of NG initiatives (described
in Section III): for its proponents, NG oﬀers a more eﬀective and just regulatory form
for achieving the same substantive policy goals that one might pursue through either
“command and control” regulation or self-regulation.
This paper aims merely to initiate a debate and propose a research agenda regarding
the emerging form of the architecture of international financial governance. It does so
by bringing together what is known in other legal and social scientific fields about
the particular regulatory technologies deployed by the FSB. The aim of this paper is
not to propose an alternative architecture, but rather to lay the groundwork for thinking
through the alternatives by suggesting how we might approach a more careful diagnosis
of the potential problems with the current taken-for-granted approach.
Although this paper is not the place for a full exposition of my own views on
possible alternatives, I ask the reader to put aside for a moment one assumption that
often stands in the way of a full consideration of the current predicament. It is often
taken for granted, implicitly or explicitly, that the current system is the only plausible
alternative to an older form of international legal governance sometimes disparaged
as “command and control” regulation. This older view is, to some extent rightly, seen
as outmoded, impractical, and ill suited to current regulatory challenges.5 However,
it is sometimes then assumed that any criticism of the current approach to regula-
tion is also an implicit argument for a return to command and control, or conversely,
......................................................................................
5. Legal scholar Jodi Short has argued that many criticisms of command and control regulation in the United States
may stem more from a general U.S. anxiety about state power and coercive government than from an objective
evaluation of past policies (Short [2012, pp. 637, 642, 681]).
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that a criticism of command and control regulation is in itself an argument for NG
regulation, as if there can only be two possibilities—NG or command and control. A
more rational and illuminating approach might consider the strengths and weaknesses
of the NG approach on its own terms. Only after we evaluate the eﬃcacy of the current
model can we determine whether it is indeed the best possible option and how it might
be reformed.
The analysis proceeds as follows. In Section II, I describe the pervading understand-
ing of the “problem” of G-SIFIs at successive layers of complexity, and I then describe
what kind of practical policy response to this problem is entailed in the regulatory
approach of the FSB. In Section III, I analyze the problems and solutions outlined
in Section II from the standpoint of the body of regulatory theory that most directly
corresponds to (and has most directly influenced) this approach. This body of regu-
latory theory—the so-called NG literature—claims developments in global financial
governance as a prime example of its applications, and has indirectly influenced the
architecture of global financial governance by means of models borrowed from
initiatives in Europe such as the “open method of coordination” (OMC) of the European
Union (EU) and eﬀorts in the United States to establish models of reflexive
administrative law such as the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act.
In Section IV, I evaluate NG as implemented by the FSB as an architecture of
international financial governance. Experts in financial regulation in both the academy
and government who have focused on the eﬀects of particular NG initiatives prior to
and since the financial crisis are far less enthusiastic than proponents of NG about
its practical prospects for success in this area. Indeed, much of the initiative for current
transnational rule-making derives from concerns about the potential pitfalls or
limitations of pre-financial crisis, NG-style initiatives as applied prior to 2008 in the
United States and Europe to the relationship between regulators and financial market
participants. And yet, ironically, at the very moment at which the FSB is busy creating
rules and procedures to supplement the failures of pre-2008 domestic regulation that,
in many North Atlantic countries, was inspired in important parts by the NG model,
the FSB is itself applying much of the same regulatory architecture with little critical
evaluation to the relationship between international and domestic regulators—as a tool
of international regulatory coordination. To make matters worse, in the process of
transposing NG into a tool of international regulatory coordination, some of the most
innovative aspects of NG seem to have been lost, diluted, or disregarded in practice.
As described in the conclusion (Section V), a preliminary hypothesis emerges from
this analysis: NG mechanisms may be eﬀective in resolving some kinds of problems
caused by the interrelationship of legal regimes in a pluralistic regulatory order, but
they are unlikely to be suitable to all problems. This in turn suggests an agenda for
future research: detailed study of the precise conditions in which new governance tools
may or may not be eﬀective in international financial governance is sorely needed.
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II. The FSB Approach to Global Financial Architecture
This section describes the G-SIFI problem and the FSB’s response as a problem of
transnational regulation. Sections II.A and B summarize the practical challenges
G-SIFIs pose as a variation on a quite standard problem in international law and
institutions—a problem of coordination in pluralistic conditions. Section II.C describes
what is most innovative and deserving of analytical attention about the FSB’s approach
to this problem.
A. The Challenge of G-SIFIs as a Problem of International Legal Coordination
As mentioned at the outset, the challenge of G-SIFIs is that they are diﬃcult to
understand and to control from the vantage point of any singular jurisdiction, and yet
their failure can have serious consequences for multiple jurisdictions and the global
economy as a whole. The Liikanen Report commissioned by the EU to provide a
blueprint for future EU directives on banking regulation defines them as “those
institutions whose distress or disorderly failure would cause significant disruption to the
wider financial system and economic activity, due to their size, complexity, systemic
interconnectedness or lack of good substitutes that can readily take over their activities”
(Liikanen et al. [2012, p. 38]).
The regulation of G-SIFIs is therefore an inherently transnational problem that
demands both practical coordination among regulators and an understanding of how
national and international regulatory regimes interact. The proposed responses to the
risks posed by G-SIFIs can be divided into the operationally desirable but politically
unpalatable on the one hand and the more politically feasible but more diﬃcult to
operationalize on the other.
1. Option 1: Break up the G-SIFIs
If certain financial institutions are too systemically important and complex to fail, then
the most logical proposal is to break them up into smaller entities.
Prominent academic commentators, including Joseph Stiglitz and Simon Johnson,
and even some prominent market participants such as former Citigroup CEO John Reed
and former Citigroup Chairman and CEO Sanford Weill, have questioned whether
the increasingly large size of financial conglomerates contributes to wider economic
welfare to a degree that is proportionate to the externalities they impose on the global
economy. Legal scholars, likewise, have proposed that existing anti-trust law might be
used to break up some of these conglomerates (Reich [2010]). As the de Larosie`re
Report outlining the EU position on financial regulation explains,
Given their size and the structural function they have for the financial system as
a whole, [SIFIs] are, to some extent, “too big to manage” and “too big to fail”—
which means that they can expose the rest of society to major costs and are
subject to acute moral hazard; in some instances, these institutions can even be
“too big to save”, for example when they are head-quartered in a relatively small
country or when the organisation of a rescue package is simply too complex
to implement.6
......................................................................................
6. de Larosie`re (2009, p. 62).
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However, most policymakers believe that this approach is for the moment unfeasible
due to the opposition of powerful financial institutions (Krugman [2010]). As the de
Larosie`re report makes clear:
However, although this may be desirable in instances of excessive market dom-
inance under anti-trust law, it is unlikely that large financial institutions will be
broken up into component parts.7
2. Option 2: Government liquidation or nationalization in conditions of crisis
If the failure of a G-SIFI spreads risk throughout the financial system and imposes
costs on taxpayers, another logical proposal would be to give regulators the authority
to nationalize or liquidate banks whose capital ratio falls below a certain level (Butler
[2009]). However, again, many observers believe this is politically unfeasible at least in
the United States due to the public’s distaste for government ownership of private assets
(Blinder [2009]) and regulators’ fear that liquidation is an admission of regulatory
failure (Coﬀee [2011, p. 839]).
3. Option 3: Preparedness
The dominant approach, therefore, has been to focus on drafting firm-specific plans
for a more orderly resolution of institutions that pose general systemic or “macro-
prudential” risks (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation [2011]). This is the approach
embodied in the U.S. Dodd–Frank legislation (the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010)8 as well as in the focus on identifying G-SIFIs
and requiring that they hold up to an additional 2.5 percent of capital in reserve, in
addition to the amount enshrined in the Basel III accords and implemented in recent
framework documents promulgated by the FSB (Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision [2011]). The new FSB standard on resolution promulgated in October
2011, for example, emphasizes “mandatory resolvability assessment and a recovery and
resolution plan for each global SIFI,”9 as well as “a cross-border cooperation agreement
between relevant authorities” (Draghi [2011]).
The centerpiece of this approach is the imposition of additional capital requirements
on G-SIFIs both to guard against and ultimately insulate taxpayers from bearing the
cost of resolution (Dash [2011]).10 Other proposals include mandating that financial
institutions create “living wills” that purport to define how they would be resolved
at times of crisis—an approach now enshrined in U.S. regulations (Enrich 2010)—and
shifting the burden of loss to bond holders by mandating that certain categories of bonds
stipulate that they convert to ordinary shares when a bank’s capitalization drops to a
certain level (contingent convertible [CoCo] bonds or bail-in debt) (Hart and Zingales
[2010]). There are also proposals to impose additional taxes on G-SIFIs to create a fund
......................................................................................
7. de Larosie`re (2009, p. 62).
8. It is the basis of Title I, Section 165 of Dodd–Frank that directs the Federal Reserve to apply prudential
standards to systemically important bank and nonbank financial institutions (Romano and Verstein [2011,
p. 48], comments of Tom Baxter, general counsel of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York).
9. A total of 28 G-SIFIs had been designated as of November 2012.
10. Basel III imposes “requirements for globally systemically important banks to hold additional common equity
capital above the Basel III minimum standards, rising from 1% to 2.5% of risk-weighted assets commensurate
with the systemic impact of their failure, to be fully phased in by 2019” (Draghi [2011]).
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that would cover resolution costs or to ask other financial institutions to cover the cost
of the bailout of one of their peers after a crisis has occurred (Singh [2011]).
However, problems remain with all of these eﬀorts to prepare for the next failure of
a G-SIFI. First, many question whether the preparations are suﬃcient. Lehman Brothers
itself, for example, probably would not have been required to post the additional
capital requirements demanded of G-SIFIs under the current regime (Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation [2011]). CoCos raise a host of problems, from how to price such
instruments and whether they are open to legal challenge to their possible contagion
eﬀects at times of crisis (Pazarbasioglu et al. [2011]). More generally, planning for the
future is diﬃcult and the experience of past crises is not always a good guide. Living
wills, for example, are unlikely to bear much resemblance to actual crisis conditions
and hence are somewhat academic exercises (Gilani [2011]).11 As pointed out by Black
(2010), “the solution of an orderly liquidation process for global financial conglom-
erates is untested, and many doubt whether it will work to prevent future financial
crises.” In the 2011 Mayekawa Lecture at the Bank of Japan’s Institute for Monetary
and Economic Studies, Goodhart and Tsomocos (2011, p. 63) likewise conclude, “The
experience of the failure of Lehman Brothers was so appalling that most governments
thereafter decided that liquidation of a SIFI could not be tolerated.”
4. The corollary: Coordination among regulators
The backstop to this preparedness approach, therefore, is better coordination among
regulators with the hope that it will lead to greater degrees of trust and better coordina-
tion at a moment of future crisis. This focus on building channels for coordination and
information-sharing responds directly to the failures of coordination between U.S. and
U.K. regulators at the time of the Lehman crisis of 2008. Yet commentators and policy-
makers alike have decried inadequate levels of information-sharing regarding G-SIFIs
among national regulators (Corcoran [2011] and Brummer [2011]).
In particular, the failure of a G-SIFI creates potential conflicts of interest between a
G-SIFI’s home jurisdiction and the host jurisdictions in which the G-SIFI does business.
In a situation of G-SIFI failure, by definition there are not suﬃcient assets to cover
the G-SIFI’s liabilities globally and regulators and courts are often tempted to favor
their own nationals over other creditors. If the home jurisdiction’s courts or regulators
can assert control over the G-SIFI’s assets worldwide, then they may use available
assets to compensate their own national creditors first. Conversely, if a host jurisdiction
can, through its courts or by administrative regulation, assert legal jurisdiction over the
G-SIFI’s assets located within its territory, then the host jurisdiction’s courts or regula-
tors may use these assets to compensate creditors located within the jurisdiction first.
Because home and host regulators anticipate such behavior at moments of the failure
of a G-SIFI, they may be reticent to share information for fear of creating tactical
advantages for regulators on the other side.
......................................................................................
11. The living-will project exemplifies a response to the threat of future crisis that social scientists have observed in
many other arenas, from environmental to security to medical risks. The approach is to prepare what scholars
term “fantasy documents” concerning preparedness that outline procedures which in all likelihood bear little
resemblance to what would need to be done or would actually be done at the moment of crisis. Social scientists
have argued that the true function of such documents is to generate public confidence in the present, rather
than to mitigate disaster in the future, and also to create a project that necessitates cooperation and hence gives
the parties an opportunity to work together and build relationships (Clarke [1999]).
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Hence the problem of coordination between home and host regulators is a central
focus of the FSB (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision [2006]). The stated task of
the FSB is to “significantly step up cooperation amongst authorities to prepare feasible
and credible G-SIFI resolution plans” (Draghi [2011]).
B. The Limits of Harmonization as a Coordination Technique
To understand why NG emerges as an appealing regulatory architecture for the FSB
as it addresses coordination problems among regulators, it is necessary to understand
what NG innovates against—international harmonization. Up to this point, most
attempts at financial regulatory coordination have emphasized a more classical inter-
national legal solution to coordination: harmonized rules agreed upon at the interstate
level and translated into substantially similar national laws by domestic legislatures
or enforced by domestic regulators. The legal mechanism of choice for regulatory
coordination of this kind has been the interstate agreement. These agreements have
traditionally been negotiated among national financial regulators of the G20 nations12
through the Basel Committee (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision [2010b])
and then sanctioned by heads of state at G20 meetings.13 But they are intended to be
global in scope—to apply to the G20 nations as well as the non-G20 nations (Helleiner
[2010]). The aim is for the content of these agreements to supersede conflicting national
law by implementing legislation or changes in regulatory practice in each country
(Helleiner [2010]).
Why did this kind of formal harmonization traditionally seem like a necessary
form of coordination? As domestic regulators in jurisdictions such as the United States
pursued domestic reforms, they confronted a steady drumbeat of threats that markets
would respond to additional regulatory burdens by moving business to jurisdictions
that did not have heightened regulatory requirements (Gonzalez and Schipke [2011]).
National regulators responded to this threat of regulatory arbitrage and of a “race to
the bottom” by attempting to ensure that other jurisdictions had roughly the same
regulatory burdens as their own (Eubanks [2010]). One concern for the national
regulator at the international level has been to ensure that domestic regulatory reform
does not lead to a decrease in the size of the domestic financial industry. Thus,
international harmonization of regulatory standards has traditionally been seen as the
necessary corollary of domestic regulatory reform.
In other words, one emblem at this early stage of international financial governance
is that national regulators act on the international plane with quite a nationalist view
of their interests: other nations’ markets are of concern primarily insofar as they pose
financial risks to the domestic market or they become a potential source of competition
for the domestic market because of lower regulatory standards. Yet the implication of
this nationalist orientation, ironically, is that it becomes necessary to push for global
harmonization and standardization over national diversity in regulatory approaches,
that is, to favor harmonization rather than pluralism as a modality of international
legal architecture.
......................................................................................
12. Prior to 2009, such agreements were negotiated among the so-called Group of 10 (G10) nations only.
13. In the past, these proposals were approved at G7 meetings.
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In practice, harmonization as an architectural model leads to numerous problems.
First, harmonization typically takes the form of substantive rules, such as capital
adequacy requirements for systemically important financial institutions. One practical
reason for the emphasis on harmonizing rules at the Basel Committee and the FSB is
that rules are relatively easy to identify, describe, and produce compared to regulatory
standards or practices. Yet harmonized rules mean little if the degree of supervision
concerning adherence to these rules varies widely from one jurisdiction to another.
As argued by Pan (2010), rule making does not in itself translate into better
regulatory supervision:
International law scholars who analyze the performance of transgovernmental
networks should distinguish between rulemaking and standards setting, on the
one hand, and supervision, on the other. This distinction is important because
one of the main achievements of transgovernmental networks has been to drive
convergence and harmonization of national rules and standards in the areas
of banking, securities, and insurance. Basel I and Basel II, for example,
are successful instances where a transgovernmental network has been able to
produce a broadly accepted set of regulatory standards. The recent financial
crisis, however, demonstrated that the real need for regulatory action is in the
area of supervision.14
Likewise, Julie Dickson, the Superintendent of Financial Institutions of Canada,
has argued that current reforms give too much attention to rule making and not nearly
enough attention to the process of supervision itself:
If we take the view that supervisory judgment has failed time and again, and that
we should therefore rely far more on rules than on supervisors going forward,
we may create a system with even more risk, as rules often have unintended
consequences which can take quite some time to see. As well, our record in
getting rules right is not stellar. Stricter rules, like substantially higher capital
requirements, can create a false sense of security; an institution will never have
enough capital if there are material flaws in its risk management practices. That
is why supervision matters.15
A related problem with harmonization as an international governance structure is
a pervasive lack of support from domestic politicians, banks, the public, and even
regulators in many jurisdictions for rule making at the international level. Global agree-
ments require domestic support for implementation, but in many jurisdictions domestic
constituencies, from legislators to market participants, have proven to be profoundly
skeptical of newly harmonized rules (Tarullo [2008]). The consequence is often the
practical impossibility of full compliance with internationally harmonized rules.
......................................................................................
14. Pan (2010, pp. 264–265).
15. Dickson (2010, p. 624).
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Likewise, the lack of will for coordination among regulators themselves—the sense
of national competition that often pervades the sense of the common good—also
impedes harmonization eﬀorts. Unwillingness on the part of national regulators to
adhere to internationally harmonized standards is likely to be even stronger in cases
of emerging markets not represented at the FSB or the G20.
For all of these reasons, even many of the proponents of international legal
harmonization agree that full or substantial harmonization of regulatory standards in the
short to medium term is most likely impossible. Yet many commentators and policy-
makers go further to argue that even if it were achievable, harmonization is the wrong
objective—that it is not desirable in the first place.
First, diﬀerent jurisdictions face diﬀerent conditions and diﬀerent problems. For
example, as Jeﬀrey Gordon commented in April 2011 at a round-table discussion on
Dodd–Frank held at the Yale Law School, the U.S. focus on the liquidation of G-SIFIs
reflects options available to U.S. regulators given the size of the U.S. economy and of
the Treasury relative to the size of failing financial institutions that may not be available
to other countries. For other countries, the focus rather must be on preventing the failure
of institutions that are “too big to save” through higher capital adequacy requirements
and bail-ins.16
Equally importantly, where systemic risk is created by “herd mentalities” in which
market participants pursue common strategies, diﬀerent regulatory approaches may
act as a stopgap against contagion by incentivizing diﬀerent business models (Smits
[2010] and Low [2010]). As Takafumi Sato, former commissioner of Japan’s Financial
Services Agency explained in an op-ed article in the Financial Times in 2009,
“A global community adopting a uniform platform is vulnerable to a virus, as we have
witnessed during the current financial pandemic. Capital adequacy regulations should
be designed to foster diversity in business models, demanding the right level of capital
for the business type of the bank in question” (Sato [2009]; see also Riles [2011]). As
Gordon and Mayer (2011, p. 1) noted regarding the 2008 Lehman crisis, “[O]ne saving
grace . . .was that most countries in the world had not adopted state of the art, ‘most
advanced’ regulatory and governance practices.”
On these points, policymakers and academics interested in international financial
regulation would most likely benefit from more active engagement with state-of-the-art
international regulatory theory more generally. The inability of regulators to deliver on
promises made at international forums in the face of domestic pressure from legislators
or market participants is a well-documented problem in international law and
institutions (Vezirgiannidou [2009]). Competition among national representatives and
the lack of will for coordination among regulators—the sense of national competition
that often outweighs the sense of the common good—is also a problem that repeats
itself in numerous international regulatory fields. These problems have been addressed
in various ways and with varying degrees of success at diﬀerent periods in interna-
tional legal history—from state-to-state agreements to the construction of international
......................................................................................
16. Of course, individual jurisdictions are free to adopt higher capital requirements than those stipulated by Basel
III and some are taking steps to do so. As the Vickers Report comments, however, jurisdictions that do so
risk putting themselves at a disadvantage due to regulatory arbitrage (Independent Commission on Banking
[2011, p. 9]).
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institutions to the development of customary international law (Krisch and Kingsbury
[2006]). Moreover, an extensive literature on global legal pluralism now demonstrates
that legal pluralism is a given condition of transnational legality that cannot ever be
eliminated. In fact, this literature demonstrates that pluralism has numerous advan-
tages and hence must be incorporated into transnational legal governance (Michaels
[2009], Berman [2009], Teubner [1997], and Radaelli and Meuwese [2009]). Hence the
challenges posed by global harmonization initiatives in international financial
regulation are not unique to this field. I turn now to the question of how the FSB
confronts these challenges.
C. Three Key Elements of FSB Methodology
The FSB has acquired credibility as a site for coordinating financial regulatory standards
and for creating soft law mechanisms to ensure compliance. However the FSB’s formal
legal authorities are extremely limited. Article 2 of the FSB charter grants the FSB the
authority only to “assess vulnerabilities aﬀecting the global financial system,” to “pro-
mote coordination and information exchange,” “monitor and advise on market devel-
opments,” and “advise and monitor on best practice in meeting regulatory standards.”
As if to make the point absolutely clear, Article 16, the final article of the charter,
states, “This Charter is not intended to create any legal rights or obligations” (Financial
Stability Board [2009a]).17
So with these limited powers, how does the FSB tackle a coordination problem
that the standard international legal tools have proven to be incapable of resolving?
Its approach is innovative. It aims to address, on the one hand, the interrelated quality
of domestic regulatory systems, and on the other hand, the political diﬃculties asso-
ciated with achieving and implementing international consensus on harmonized rules
(Moschella [2010]) through a new set of institutional tools borrowed directly from re-
cent institutional innovations in the EU (Radaelli and Meuwese [2009]) and the United
States. Three principal kinds of initiatives deserve attention: standard-setting projects;
peer review; and cross-border, firm-specific coordination.
1. Standard setting
In theory at least, the FSB circumvents some of the problems of harmonization
initiatives as embodied in standard international legal frameworks by emphasizing
broad standards, “best practices,” or “rules of thumb” for regulators rather than hard
and specific rules.18;19 Standards—what some commentators such as Arner and Taylor
(2009, p. 7) have referred to as the FSB’s “soft law approach” to contrast this
architecture with rules and regulations—are seen as preferable tools of global finan-
cial regulation because they allow for pluralism (for diﬀerences in national strategy
and emphasis) within a framework of certain common baselines and shared regulatory
values. Standards are also viewed as more flexible than rules and hence more able to
accommodate future problems that may not be foreseen at the moment of rule drafting.
......................................................................................
17. The de Larosie`re report goes further and calls for reforming the FSB into a more robust institution that would
more closely resemble the IMF; see also Arner and Taylor (2009).
18. The FSB charter refers five times to the purpose of the FSB as to develop or implement “standards,” but makes
no reference at all to “rules” or “regulations” (Financial Stability Board [2009a]).
19. Some people involved in the work of the FSB do not take the view that the FSB distinguishes between
“standards” and “rules” and that it adopts a standard-setting approach rather than a rule-making approach.
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This focus on standards over rules is not unique to the FSB. The June 2004 Basel II
Accords were already largely principle-based agreements.20
Yet, in practice, these standards seem to shade into a regime that takes on more
and more of the trappings of traditional international legal rules and norms (Karmel
and Kelly [2008]). In the area of G-SIFIs, for example, the FSB in October 2011
promulgated what then Chairman Mario Draghi ambiguously described in his letter
to the G20 prior to the Cannes Summit as “[a] new international standard—[on the res-
olution of financial institutions] as a point of reference for consistent reform of national
resolution regimes.” In this slippery language, a mere standard or “point of reference”
also becomes something more than that, the basis for “consistent reform” and “a new
international standard.”
2. Peer review
The FSB moves beyond earlier institutions, however, with its focus on peer review.
Peer review is a soft law technique for implementing harmonized regulatory standards.
Countries report on their progress in implementing particular standards, and these
reports are in turn evaluated by a committee of peers. The peer review technique
was borrowed directly from recent institutional innovations in the EU where, as the
name suggests, it was modeled on the academic practices for evaluating scholarship.21
The secretariat engages those who fail to comply in a “confidential dialogue” that can
ultimately lead to public “naming and shaming” (Walter [2010]). An FSB “scoreboard”
on its website “tracks progress across the full range of reforms” (Draghi [2011, p. 3]).
Redacted versions of peer review results are published on the FSB website. Beyond
this, there are no clear penalties for failure to participate in the peer review process or
comply with international regulatory standards.
Peer reviews are of two types: “country peer reviews” focusing on one individual
country’s success in implementing standards, to which countries agree to submit as a
condition of their membership in the FSB, and “thematic peer reviews” focusing on
one particular problem or regulatory initiative across diﬀerent countries.22 The FSB
describes the procedure as follows:
FSB peer reviews will be based on reports drafted by small teams composed
of experts from FSB member jurisdictions and international bodies, supported
......................................................................................
20. After establishing specific principles regarding requirements for capital reserves, which local regulators such
as the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) formally integrated into national programs like the
Consolidated Supervised Entities (CSE) Program, Basel II left the details of risk assessment to the individual
institutions themselves (Ford [2010a]). On the wider relationship between rules and standards in regulatory
practice see Kennedy (1976) and Schauer (2005).
21. The peer review process itself was first developed in the mid-17th century, when the Royal Society of London
began to circulate potential journal articles among experts in the relevant field for comments on a piece’s
suitability and worth (Klug [1999]). By the 20th century, the practice had become widespread across academic
disciplines, as publishers found that a group of independent experts with similar knowledge could provide
the best judgment of a work’s merit in a rapidly changing field, and further, that they were most helpful
in improving the quality of a paper through comments and feedback. Like academic journals that made a
practice of delegating authority to a community of practicing peers, within the realm of financial regulation,
the peer review technique has been used to reimagine accountability outside the box of static compliance to
authoritative rules.
22. For an example of a recently completed national peer review, see Financial Stability Board (2012a). For an
example of a recently completed thematic review, see Financial Stability Board (2011a).
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by the FSB Secretariat. The substantive review by peers will take place in the
Standing Committee on Standards Implementation. The final responsibility for
approving FSB peer reviews lies with the Plenary, as the decision-making body
of the FSB. In keeping with the FSB’s commitment to lead by example, peer
review reports will be published, along with any commentary provided by the
reviewed jurisdictions for inclusion. Following publication of the report, juris-
dictions’ implementation of agreed actions will be monitored by the FSB and, if
implementation lags, peer pressure may be applied.23
The FSB’s own oﬃcial objectives for peer review span a number of analytically
disparate purposes, from the rather benign goal of information exchange and the more
interventionist goal of evaluating FSB members’ adherence to their commitments, to
norm building (what the FSB terms “fostering a race to the top”), to evaluating and
rethinking the content of international regulatory standards and approaches themselves.
The last of these is important to the peer review ideal: as NG proponents Sabel and
Zeitlin explain, the peer review process creates a kind of accountability that “anticipates
the transformation of rules in use” (Sabel and Zeitlin [2008]). In the future, the FSB
promises even “more intense monitoring in priority areas: the Basel capital and liquidity
framework; over-the-counter derivatives market reforms; compensation practices;
G-SIFI policy measures; resolution frameworks; and shadow banking” (Draghi
[2011, p. 3]).
FSB peer reviews are largely paper reviews in which a committee of 4–9 repre-
sentatives of member jurisdictions and international organizations appointed by the
FSB Standing Committee on Standards Implementation (SCSI) reviews member states’
responses to a questionnaire, supplemented by other documentation such as the results
of prior peer reviews or other academic or legal materials the committee may request or
procure. The FSB handbook on peer review also anticipates that peer review committees
would provide the public with an opportunity to comment on the review process through
their website (Financial Stability Board [2011d]).
The committee then drafts a report of approximately 15 pages and submits this to
the SCSI, where it is discussed (and representatives of the country under review are
given an opportunity to respond). Ultimately the report is submitted to the FSB Plenary
for approval and then is posted on the FSB website. An FSB diagram of this process
somewhat romantically portrays an amorphous entity it terms the “public at large” as
the ultimate judge and arbiter of national regulatory compliance (Figure 1).24
In sum, peer review as practiced by the FSB is a governance regime that carries only
a possible reputational sanction. What defines this particular implementation of peer
review as a mode of governance therefore is not so much the sanction as the regularized
practice of periodic and extensive self-evaluation and reporting requirements. On this
front, the FSB has instituted a busy schedule of self-reporting requirements whereby
......................................................................................
23. Financial Stability Board (2010).
24. As Cristie Ford (personal comment) points out, the diagram bears an ironic resemblance to Ayres and
Braithwaite’s “enforcement pyramid” (Ayres and Braithwaite [1992, pp. 35–38]). The resemblance is ironic,
because Ayres and Braithwaite’s pyramid is intended to point out that informal sanctions are eﬀective only in
the shadow of more formal penalties for noncompliance.
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Figure 1 Structure of Information Flows for G20 Reporting
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national regulators must complete questionnaires concerning their regulatory activities
and their compliance with international standards.
For example, a questionnaire developed for a thematic review on risk governance
contains approximately 50 detailed questions, to be answered by already-busy national
regulators in just over one month. The questionnaire is posted on the website, but
responses are not made public. Although the questions are framed as merely for
information-gathering purposes, many assume a clear normative framework and set of
policy preferences, and the survey prompts national regulators into a kind of
self-evaluation according to the policy preferences. For example, question 1.1 reads:
Please describe your jurisdiction’s overall approach to assessing firms’ risk
governance frameworks (e.g. legislation, regulation or supervisory guidance)?
Please provide links to relevant documents. Has your jurisdiction evaluated
whether such guidance is consistent with the BCBS or OECD principles on
corporate governance or other recommendations provided by the industry?25
The message is clear. Member states should be evaluating themselves according
to international standards. Regulators completing this survey may find it rather
embarrassing to have to answer any part of this question in the negative. Moreover,
......................................................................................
25. Financial Stability Board (2012c, p. 3).
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“risk governance” is defined quite specifically in the questions to include the internal
institutional structures in place within private firms for monitoring and managing risk,
such as the competence and authority of risk management departments and the authority
of boards, and also the regulatory practices for monitoring these structures. Regulators
completing this survey may also find it quite uncomfortable to have to admit to their
global peers that financial institutions in their jurisdiction do not have exactly this
kind of organizational structure for managing risk. Hence the peer review process of
answering these questions also encourages regulators to set up similar levels of review
among the market participants they regulate.
3. Supervisory colleges
A third architectural innovation worthy of mention is the “supervisory colleges” aimed
at the cross-border regulation of individual financial institutions and in particular the
coordination of home and host regulators. Again, the model for this initiative was a
similar experiment of the same name conducted by regulators in the EU (de Larosie`re
[2009, p. 61]). The goal is to
enhance information exchange and cooperation between supervisors to support
the eﬀective supervision of international banking groups. Colleges should
enhance the mutual trust and appreciation of needs and responsibilities on which
supervisory relationships are built.26
What is new here, from the standpoint of international law, is that regulation is
not generally applicable to all, but rather is specific to a particular non-state actor:
regulators convene to develop specific protocols for information sharing concerning a
specific financial institution. Rules, procedures, and information sharing across borders
are being developed tailored to, and applicable only to, one particular target of
regulation. For example, a supervisory college concerning Citibank would assemble
regulators27 in each jurisdiction with intimate knowledge of and authority over Citibank
in their jurisdiction and develop protocols for information sharing in times of crisis,
build relationships among individual regulators, and devise regulatory policies,
procedures, and strategies tailored to Citibank’s particular situation. In the environ-
mental or security context, in contrast, one does not create environmental regulations
that apply to only one polluter or security laws that apply to only one terrorist organi-
zation (even if in practice general rules are often created in response to a specific case).
Thus, the model dispenses with the traditional formal model of regulation in favor of
something more pragmatic, and it also recognizes that regulation is conducted by real
people—and that personal relationships among regulators are as significant a source
of regulatory stability and strength as, for example, sanctions against governments for
failure to share information might be.
......................................................................................
26. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010a, p. 2).
27. Ford describes the regulatory advantages of enforcement teams that are ad hoc, specific to the context of a
firm, and flexible to the needs of the job (Ford [2005, pp. 819–821]).
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D. Conclusion to Section II
In sum, the FSB responds to the challenges of an interrelated but plural global
regulatory environment with some new tools and approaches borrowed largely from
the European experience in coordinating among diverse regulatory authorities within
the EU. These tools and approaches are not particularly legal in nature—indeed, the
FSB has minimal formal legal authority over its members. They are rather pragmatic
and problem-oriented. And they are sociologically and institutionally grounded: they
emphasize relationships, reputations, and the gradual evolution of norms and standards
through repeat encounters.
III. The New Governance Approach
Although the FSB initiatives described in the previous section eschew traditional legal
approaches, therefore, they draw powerfully on one popular body of regulatory theory
known as New Governance (NG). As described in this section, NG theories of the
government’s role in coordinating optimal regulatory outcomes developed first in the
context of domestic regulatory problems as a new way of thinking about the continuing
role of the state in the context of free market challenges to all forms of regulation,
but they were later picked up as a tool for interstate coordination among disparate
regulators and regulatory regimes in the EU in regulatory contexts other than finance
such as labor and environmental standards.28 These initiatives received enthusiastic
academic attention as innovative and novel approaches to age-old problems concerning
the lack of enforceability and hence “soft law” character of international law.
From there, European regulators with personal experience of this model imported
these methods into the FSB and other emerging nodes of contemporary global
financial governance.
For NG theorists, the implicit but pervasive application of their theory by the FSB
and related institutions has naturally been a source of enthusiasm and pride. In
Section IV, I will evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of NG as a mode of global
financial governance. However, because most financial regulators and experts in
financial law are not very familiar with the NG debates that lie beneath the surface
of current initiatives in their field, this section first lays out the key elements of the NG
approach to regulation, its theoretical origins, and its distinctive characteristics.
A. What Is New Governance?
The term New Governance captures a variety of regulatory approaches that
emphasize a shift away from traditional “command and control” regulation toward
more reflexive, collaborative, and experimental forms of governance. Instead of
mandating certain behavior through regulations and directives, NG regulates through
“a continuous dynamic process governed by the relevant stakeholders” (Bingham
[2010, p. 300]). Here, the task of government is to coordinate and facilitate collective
information sharing and learning:
......................................................................................
28. Other strands of NG techniques were developed in the United States in a variety of policy areas including
environmental protection, health care, public school reform, and public housing (Karkkainen [2004,
pp. 474–475]).
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[N]ew governance regulation, unlike command and control regulation, is
regulation based on an iterative process between private party experience and
a regulator that serves variously as clearinghouse, catalyst, monitor, prod,
and coordinator.29
As de Bu´rca and Scott explain in the introduction to their collection of essays on
NG in the EU and the United States,
The concept of new governance is by no means a settled one. It is a construct
which has been developed to explain a range of processes and practices that
have a normative dimension but do not operate primarily or at all through the
formal mechanism of traditional command-and-control type legal institutions.
The language of governance rather than government in itself signals a shift
away from the monopoly of traditional politico-legal institutions, and implies
either the involvement of actors other than classically governmental actors, or
indeed the absence of any traditional framework of government, as is the case
in the European Union and in any transnational context. In a practical sense, the
concept of new governance results from a sharing of experience by practitioners
and scholars across a wide variety of policy domains which are quite diverse
and disparate in institutional and political terms, and in terms of the concrete
problem to be addressed. Yet in each case, the common features which have
been identified involve a shift in emphasis away from command-and-control
in favor of “regulatory” approaches which are less rigid, less prescriptive, less
committed to uniform outcomes, and less hierarchical in nature.30
While the term has been applied to a broad range of processes and practices,
according to Ford, there are three related convictions that underlie most NG strategies
implemented in the EU and the United States: (1) an emphasis on “learning by doing”
that includes structured learning processes which pull experience into the creation
of regulation in self-reflexive ways; (2) a recognition of the necessity for regulatory
revisability, as documented in practices such as notice-and-comment rules that allow
quick decisions by relevant actors; and finally, (3) humility about the fact that
regulators cannot know more about everyday operations than the practitioners
themselves (Ford [2010a]).
1. Valuing diversity and pluralism
One classic element of the NG approach to regulation is to set broad targets and allow
regulated entities to reach those targets in their own ways. As explained by de Bu´rca
and Scott (2006),
the idea of new or experimental governance approaches places considerable
emphasis upon the accommodation and promotion of diversity, on the
importance of provisionality and revisability—in terms of both problem
definition and anticipated solutions—and on the goal of policy learning. New
......................................................................................
29. Ford (2010a, p. 445).
30. de Bu´rca and Scott (2006, p. 2).
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governance processes generally encourage or involve the participation of
aﬀected actors (stakeholders) rather than merely representative actors, and
emphasize transparency (openness as a means to information-sharing and
learning), as well as ongoing evaluation and review. Rather than operating
through a hierarchical structure of governmental authority, the “centre” (of
a network, a regime, or other governance arrangement) may be charged with
facilitating the emergence of the governance infrastructure, and with ensuring
coordination or exchange as between constituent parts. A further characteris-
tic often present in new governance processes is the voluntary or non-binding
nature of the norms.31
2. A pragmatic approach to conflict between state and market
Another key value of the NG approach is its emphasis on experimentation and collabo-
ration. The experimental and collaborative approach has its links to U.S. management
studies, accounting techniques, theories of pedagogy, and even ethical, cultural, and
religious norms, as well as to the U.S. tradition of philosophical pragmatism (Simon
[2004]). However, in the United States, the more concrete impetus for this new approach
to regulation lies in the search by center-left academics and policymakers in local,
state, and national government for a pragmatic response to market-based critiques
of the legitimacy of state regulation. On this point, the NG argument is that markets
cannot always be counted on to produce the kind of eﬃcient and welfare-maximizing
coordination that neoliberals imagined would emerge through the institution of price:
Optimal coordination will not always emerge, however, as if led “by an invisible
hand.” Even in settings where coordination is essential, it may fail to materialize,
may emerge in a form that could have been improved upon, or may not be
amenable to displacement despite the world changing around it. There conse-
quently may be a role for regulation in encouraging, fostering, and facilitating
eﬃcient coordination [notes omitted].32
Yet, on the other hand, NG is not a call for a return to state control: it takes seriously
neoliberal critiques of the ineﬃciencies and injustices of state “command and control”
and therefore seeks a “third way” between free markets on the one hand and state
regulation on the other. As explained by Wilkinson (2010),
Attempting to escape from the sterility of many traditional social scientific
dichotomies—state versus market, regulation versus deregulation, democracy
versus expert, and technocratic governance, and so on—experimentalism draws
on our potential for reconstructing and reimagining governance—both locally,
and in a variety of national, transnational, supranational, and international
settings—according to the generic value of self-government.33
......................................................................................
31. de Bu´rca and Scott (2006, p. 3).
32. Ahdieh (2010, p. 581).
33. Wilkinson (2010, p. 676).
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Ford puts it most powerfully:
The challenge, then, is to imagine an alternative within which regulatory design
is not always a drag on human capacity and imagination, in the way that old
style non-reflexive command-and-control regulation can be, and yet that puts
suﬃcient brakes on risk-blind hubris, socially detrimental self-aggrandizement,
and predictable human flaws in decision-making and information processing.34
What this excursion into the political origins of the NG concept highlights is that
the architecture now used by the FSB to coordinate among national regulators was
developed first to address a problem in relations between state regulators—federal,
state, or municipal government—and private parties that were the target of regulation.
Thus, as with the EU “open method of coordination” (OMC), the deployment of NG
techniques by the FSB stretches those techniques further to address the state-state
relations—relations between national regulators, mediated by an international
organization, and the compliance of national governments with international law.
3. Institutional roots in EU comitology
In the late 1990s, this approach was adapted by EU staﬀ into a technocratic process for
consensus-building among national regulators in particular regulatory areas known as
the OMC peer review process:
Regulation in this model begins with councils or networks of EU oﬃcials and
member states that set framework goals, timetables, and metrics for gauging
and comparing performance. National ministries and regulators then have the
discretion to advance these goals and translate guidelines into local practice as
they see fit. But they are obliged to report their performance on those metrics,
to participate in peer reviews that compare how member state methods perform,
and to periodically revise goals, metrics, and procedures in light of those
comparisons. Again, the emphasis is to abandon fixed rules and bureaucratic
enforcement in favor of local experimentation and deliberative processes that
expose new possibilities and foster interactions in which states learn from,
discipline, and set a continually corrected baseline for one another. . . . 35
The OMC originated with the European Employment Strategy as defined in the
Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. The initial motivation behind the OMC was the need for
EU legislators to address unemployment issues in a way that accounted for national
diversity in technological and industrial expertise (Trubek and Mosher [2003]). Under
the OMC policy guidelines, EU member states set short- and long-term goals as well
as specific quantitative and qualitative indicators or benchmarks to guide the process.
These broad guidelines are then translated into national and regional policies, and
periodically monitored through a peer review process organized around forms of mutual
learning (Eberlein and Kerwer [2004, p.123]). Unlike more traditional governance
models, the point of the OMC was not to create a single common framework, but
......................................................................................
34. Ford (2010a, p. 447).
35. Schneiberg and Bartley (2008, p. 49).
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rather to encourage experiential sharing among EU member states and to establish best
practices across diverse national contexts.
By avoiding strict regulatory requirements, and instead making space for
experiments that are adjusted to local situations, the OMC has allowed the EU to
encourage policy improvement while fostering principle-based convergence. There is
now evidence that by using targets and the peer review process, EU member states have
begun to gain a better understanding about how to combat cross-border problems such
as unemployment (Trubek and Mosher [2003]). Since 1997, the OCM guidelines have
been applied to tackle a broad range of regulatory issues in the EU, and hence in eﬀect
have replaced the traditional one-size-fits-all central policy as the regulatory approach
of choice at the EU level.
In theory at least, NG as applied by the EU represents a substantial innovation
over traditional approaches to international law and institutions, as it is a practical
response to the political diﬃculties in creating binding rules at the international level.36
Its focus on consensus,37 reflexivity, and discourse draws on work in international
relations theory on the eﬀect of “epistemic communities” of global actors on norm
creation,38 while its emphasis on eﬀectuating learning across public and private divides
within a particular sectoral or regulatory area evokes Anne-Marie Slaughter’s work in
international relations on “the disaggregated state” and the displacement of traditional
states with transnational issue networks in the New World Order.39
4. Regulation by information
One central NG technique that is particularly prevalent in the emerging global
financial governance regime is “regulation by information.”40 The FSB’s “scoreboard”
......................................................................................
36. In the United States, similar eﬀorts have since been used to grapple with a federal system that governs policies
across 50 states. Examples of the NG model in the United States include among others, the Green Building
Council’s Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) standard, a voluntary certification process
that has helped standardize the metrics of sustainability while reducing the ecological footprint of new con-
struction; educational initiatives such as the No Child Left Behind Act, which creates nationwide goals and
then allows states to develop localized methods for assessing school performance; and in public housing re-
forms such as Chicago’s HOPE VI act, which replaced top-down legislation with partnerships between plan-
ners and the actual communities in need of housing projects. As argued by de Bu´rca (2010), these standards-
based reforms represent pragmatic, participatory, and information-centric strategies that are designed to enlist
states, private entities, NGOs, and other social actors in an ongoing dialogue. NG, then, aims to reshape both
the means and ends of legislation.
37. The emphasis on consensus is particularly prevalent in the European versions of NG. The U.S. versions
emphasize deliberation first and consensus second (Cristie Ford, personal comment).
38. For Slaughter (2005, p. 42), the Basel process is a good example of the workings of such “epistemic
communities.”
39. “[New Governance] rejects an image of law that is state-centered, unified, and hierarchical, underpinned by
‘the rule of law’ that protects individual rights, strictly separates political and legal powers and enforces a
chain of governmental command through formal court-centered processes. It promotes instead an image of
law that is decentered, fragmented, and heterarchical . . . ” (Wilkinson [2010, pp. 673–674]).
As pointed out by de Bu´rca and Scott (2006, p. 5), there is considerable division of scholarly opinion about
the impact of NG on traditional legal institutions, and about the normative desirability of NG tools. Some
view NG as taking power and capacity away from legal institutions (de Bu´rca and Scott [2006, p. 5]), while
for others “Law and new governance are posited as mutually interdependent and mutually sustaining. They
potentially play oﬀ one another’s strengths and mitigate one other’s [sic] weaknesses” (de Bu´rca and Scott
[2006, p. 6]).
40. “Regulation by information refers to an array of experiments with disclosure, rating/ranking systems, and
certification or labeling initiatives. Such schemes rely on the release and dissemination of information to
discipline firms and stimulate enforcement by consumers, investors, or advocacy organizations” (Schneiberg
and Bartley [2008, p. 43]).
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on its website, for example, regulates by publicly ranking jurisdictions and regulators
according to the FSB’s standards for compliance.
Regulation by information deploys certain standards or “indicators”41 to publicly
rank or comparatively evaluate countries’ performance with respect to a predetermined
global standard. This is regulation by information because although some indicators
are used as bases for awarding benefits or penalties, “[t]he majority of prominent
indicators appear to operate in global governance in even more diﬀuse ways than this,
by influencing professional, public and political opinion to craft new approaches or
take diﬀerent policy orientations” (Davis, Kingsbury, and Merry [2011, p. 20]).
Because they are perceived as technical rather than political, indicators have an
aura of objectivity about them. But as Davis, Kingsbury, and Merry (2011) suggest
with respect to World Bank indicators,
A particular feature of global governance indicators is the way they tacitly
embody theories about both the appropriate standards against which to measure
societies (or institutions) and the appropriate ways in which to measure com-
pliance with those standards. . . . Those theories are generated through dynamic
collective processes that diﬀer in significant ways from other political
processes. . . . Consequently, using any given indicator in global governance
involves tacitly accepting both a very particular set of claims about the standards
against which societies or institutions ought to be evaluated and a particular
process for generating those claims.42
And yet, from NG proponents’ point of view, this is very much the value of
regulation by information: it turns highly politicized questions—about which it is
diﬃcult to reach global consensus—into seemingly technical problems to be delegated
to experts. It trades the highly politicized processes of international negotiation for a
depoliticized practice of mutual auditing in which the FSB, as a technocratic institution,
borrows the characteristics and processes of the auditor: “independence from the matter
being audited; technical work in the form of evidence gathering and the examination
of documentation; the expression of a view based on this evidence; a clearly defined
object of the audit process” (Power [1997, p. 8]).
It is important to appreciate once again that this approach to global financial
governance is far more sociological in its orientation than legal. NG addresses age-old
challenges of public and national law—challenges such as how to generate legitimacy
for international rules and organizations, how to generate eﬀective solutions to cross-
border problems, and how to ensure that the international agreements are enforceable—
largely by exerting social pressure on regulators. These sociological tools recognize
that within the relatively circumscribed, club-like expert community of regulators
......................................................................................
41. “An indicator is a named collection of rank-ordered data that purports to represent the past or projected
performance of diﬀerent units. The data are generated through a process that simplifies raw data about a
complex social phenomenon. The data, in this simplified and processed form, are capable of being used to
compare particular units of analysis (such as countries or institutions or corporations), synchronically or over
time, and to evaluate their performance by reference to one or more standards” (Davis, Kingsbury, and Merry
[2011, p. 5]).
42. Davis, Kingsbury, and Merry (2011, p. 4).
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engaged in international financial governance activities, the club can bring considerable
informal pressure to bear on any one of its own members to come into compliance with
international standards.43 As pointed out by Brummer (2012, p. 116), these pressures
are experienced as quite real by many national regulators: “A regulator’s record of
compliance with international standards can aﬀect its reputation, and with it, its ability
to create coalitions and alliances in the future.”
What is valuable about this approach is its recognition of the role of ideas, expertise,
and communities of experts in producing international law (Riles [2000, 2011])—
dimensions that are traditionally ignored in international legal theory. This recogni-
tion is exemplified in the FSB supervisory colleges, which assume that communities of
experts can be their own basis of compliance.
One further advantage of this approach from the FSB’s point of view is that it
shifts much of the task of monitoring and promoting compliance onto the representa-
tives of regulated entities themselves—onto domestic regulators in the case of the FSB.
With the dramatic expansion of peer review, domestic regulators spend increasingly
large amounts of time evaluating their performance relative to international standards,
collecting and processing data about their performance, and communicating to real or
perceived international audiences about their activities (Merry [2011, p. S88]). Over
time, this activity is designed to have an impact on regulators’ behavior, identity, and
worldview. As noted by Dunn (2005, p. 185) in her study of an EU standards-based
regulatory project, “[t]his transforms audited managers as acting subjects: they now
have strong incentives to constantly monitor and discipline themselves in order to
ensure that the EU’s production objectives are met.”
B. Addressing the Democracy Deficit
The standards for evaluating or ranking jurisdictions are often produced by
“expert committees” and hence, in the NG approach, non-elected technocrats yield
considerable implicit power through such instruments. As such, NG is open to standard
domestic criticisms of international organizations as undemocratic and unaccountable
to domestic constituencies.
But for NG proponents, one great promise of the approach is its contribution to
the challenges of creating legitimacy and accountability for international institutions
directed by non-elected experts. Sabel and Simon (2006) write that peer review actu-
ally provides better popular accountability than the traditional formal “principal-agent”
model of democratic accountability (in which elected “agents” are accountable through
elections to the public as “principal”) because the deliberative process entailed in peer
review—what they term “dynamic accountability”—actually entails a more substantive
and meaningful form of accountability than formal electoral accountability:
......................................................................................
43. As emphasized by Schneiberg and Bartley (2008, p. 49), however, NG theorists insist that NG is more than
sociological coercion through shaming; it also requires some harder enforcement tools
including the use of comparison and penalty defaults to destabilize established understandings, the
fostering of common cognitive frameworks to discipline interest-based bargaining, and the leveraging
of higher-order processes by specific (usually domestically based) actors. Furthermore, [NG tech-
niques] feed into (and reflexively evaluate) conventional legislation by nation-states, further blurring
lines between soft and hard law processes.
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Peer review imposes on implementing “agents” the obligation to justify the
exercise of discretion they have been granted by framework-making “principals”
in the light of pooled comparable experience. In peer review, the actors at all
levels learn from and correct each other, thus undermining the hierarchical
distinction between principals and agents and creating a form of dynamic
accountability—accountability that anticipates the transformation of rules in
use. . . . To put it diﬀerently, what dynamic accountability achieves is a method
of controlling and checking the ability of participators to discern or distinguish
the right course of action when such control cannot be hard wired into the rules
of hierarchy. Within the context of the EU, multiple “agents” or the various
administrative authorities responsible for implementing EU law in their
respective jurisdictions can be expected to drift from the original intentions of
the principal authority. However, with the peer review process, the respective
administrative authorities are pushed to explain their decisions, including how
specific decisions impact other agents. In this way, the peer review process
opens accountability to possibilities that may have been initially overlooked
by the principal.44
C. Conclusion to Section III
In sum, many of the core values of NG, such as fostering regulatory pluralism, mu-
tual learning, and principled-based self-regulation rather than command and control
regulation, are clearly admirable and innovative. In theory at least, NG represents a
substantial innovation over traditional approaches to international law and institutions
because it recognizes and addresses the political diﬃculties with creating binding rules
at the international level.
And yet, the observations of experts in financial regulation concerning some
applications of these approaches, together with social scientific and legal studies of
the outcomes of NG approaches in other areas of international regulation, suggest that
the reality of NG may diﬀer somewhat from the theory. In the next section, we explore
in more detail these studies and their implications for the FSB.
IV. New Governance in Practice: A Critical Appraisal
The previous section described important recent architectural innovations in
international financial governance. Yet what are we to make of the following fact:
despite all the framework agreements, all the peer review documents, the supervisory
college meetings, and networking opportunities, many regulators confess privately to
considerable skepticism about how much progress really has been made on cross-
border coordination in the case of a failing G-SIFI since the 2008 Lehman crisis.
The view of many regulators seems to be that if a systemically important financial
institution were to fail today, the level of coordination would be relatively the same, or
at best only slightly better, than at the time of the Lehman crisis.
......................................................................................
44. Sabel and Simon (2006, p. 400). For a skeptical analysis of these claims that peer review produces deliberation
and that deliberation translates into accountability, see Shapiro (2004).
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This should, I believe, give us some pause. If these regulators are correct in their
skepticism, then one might legitimately ask whether all this novel activity is really
delivering enough added value to justify the tremendous time and expense involved.
Why is there so little buy-in on the part of various domestic constituencies (Moschella
[2010])—market participants, legislators, even domestic regulators—to this new
approach to international governance? Does this suggest the need for any skepticism
about the almost euphoric claims made on behalf of NG approaches? Surprisingly, to
date no serious empirical research on this subject has been undertaken in the area of
global financial regulation. The intuitive appropriateness of the NG model has more or
less been taken for granted by regulators focused more on the substantive details of the
policy agenda.
In the absence of such research, this section draws together what can be known
about the strengths and weaknesses of the NG architecture in two ways. To begin with,
NG methods were deployed in many sectors of domestic financial regulation prior to
the crisis of 2008, and the weaknesses of these methods in the domestic context are
widely appreciated. Indeed, it is the awareness of these weaknesses that spurs many
eﬀorts at more robust international financial regulation. And yet, remarkably, the same
methods are now being redeployed on the terrain of transnational financial governance.
This time, the targets of regulation are not private firms but domestic regulators in
FSB member jurisdictions, and it is possible that this diﬀerence somehow eliminates
the problems documented in the domestic context. On the other hand, it is also possible
that this diﬀerence exacerbates the problems: a review of the implementation of NG
by the FSB suggests a number of ways in which in this new application NG has
actually lost some of its more innovative aspects. Second, I analyze the known aspects
of the FSB governance structure. Where appropriate in this section, I draw analogies to
available research on the application of NG techniques in other fields of transnational
regulation. This analysis suggests both some potential weaknesses of NG as an archi-
tecture of international financial governance overall, and also some possible conditions
for determining when the method might be most appropriate and eﬀective and when it
might not.
A. Lessons Learned from NG in Financial Regulation Prior to 2008
Few NG experts claim any substantive knowledge of international financial
regulation. The exception is Ford (2010b, 2011), whose work lies squarely at the
intersection of both fields. Ford’s survey of three recent examples of failure or
underperformance of NG-style financial regulation prior to the financial crisis, such
as principle-based regulatory approaches to shadow banking deployed by the SEC and
the Basel II accords, gives us a more limited and pessimistic picture of how NG might
be used in financial regulation. One example is regulators’ past reliance on market
participants’ own risk management models to determine the nature and size of risks
in the global economy. Although from a NG perspective this might have seemed like
a wonderful collaborative approach to regulation, an approach that devolves authority
to the market participants and enlists them in the project of governance, Ford (2010a,
p. 461) concludes that “[r]egulatory faith in industry actors’ competence, if not literally
their bona fides, proved to have been misplaced to catastrophic eﬀect.”
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From this and other examples, Ford finds a number of potential weaknesses in the
NG approach, at least as it has been applied to date in real-world financial regulatory
contexts. First, information-based governance relies too heavily on regulated parties
for information:
Information-based analysis and reason-giving (essential elements of new
governance thinking) also seem to collapse in times of economic exuberance,
when those involved are more willing to suspend disbelief. Market bubbles may
also be times when regulators’ budgets are under pressure, because problems are
not at the forefront of peoples’ minds. The duty to give reasons and explain is
further hampered by extreme complexity of the sort that characterizes modern
financial markets.45
In response, Ford (2010a, p. 444) argues “for a renewed appreciation of the
amount of energy required to move people oﬀ their short-term incentives—an amount
substantially greater than was put into the monitorship or principle-based regulatory
initiatives . . . ” She notes
the ways in which background conditions that are either subtle or taken for
granted—including lack of diversity, power imbalances, unequal access to
information, and failures of transparency and accountability—have the potential
to make reasonably designed regulatory initiatives ineﬀective, or worse. These
are stories in which well-resourced actors were able to control loosely struc-
tured, fluid environments in their own interest, with minimal pushback from
public-interested voices. In other words, they are situations in which our flawed
humanity (tribal, short-sighted, self-interested but often irrational, and prone
to satisficing) infiltrated regulatory models, reintroduced power relationships in
indistinct but convincing ways, and arguably determined outcomes to a greater
degree than did regulatory design.46
Second, the enthusiasm in the NG project for local experimentation assumes too
quickly that industry representatives will make choices that are in the public interest:
In practical terms, the “local level” in new governance regulation cannot be a
black box. Moreover, we cannot presume that public-regarding or long-term
thinking will automatically be produced at this level. Without a considerable
oversight mechanism that tests those groups’ assumptions, those groups will
develop suboptimal resolutions. For example, a local level comprised of
self-interested bankers cannot be counted on to self-regulate eﬀectively where
no one is acting as an active, public-regarding counterweight in their interpretive
community. What this means is that we should perhaps be wary of industry
eﬀorts toward “pre-emptive self-regulation.” We should not assume that
......................................................................................
45. Ford (2010a, p. 473).
46. Ford (2010a, p. 448).
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regulators will necessarily be able to adapt measures that were initially taken
to pre-empt regulation into a more consequential project.47
Third, the NG emphasis on coordination—with its quite benign image of the
diﬀerences among interested parties—fails to fully take into account how powerful
market participants may be, relative to regulators, both in terms of their influence
over the political process and their ability to shape the dominant consensus about how
markets should be regulated.
Regulation cannot be understood without reference to the broader social,
political and institutional contexts that contains it. Beyond pure regulatory
design, the financial crisis makes clear that questions about the appropriate
regulatory mix of strategies do not take place in isolation from questions of
power and influence, which directly aﬀect feasibility and eﬀectiveness
in practice.48
B. Practical Shortcomings in the Application of New Governance by the FSB
Ford’s research highlights potential concerns about the eﬃcacy of NG as applied prior
to the 2008 crisis to public regulation of private market participants. And yet, just at the
moment at which these failures are widely acknowledged, the same regulatory methods
are being applied at the international level to coordination among national and interna-
tional regulators. It is possible that what was less than fully successful at the national
level, in the relationship among public and private actors, might succeed at the interna-
tional level, in the relationship among various categories of public actors. But it seems
counterintuitive to assume such success without further evaluation. Moreover, a review
of the application of NG by the FSB suggests new challenges to regulatory success and
ways in which some of the more innovative or hopeful dimensions of NG actually have
been lost in the translation to international governance.
1. Limited participation
NG posits an expanded community of stakeholders in which regulatory legitimacy is
generated by including as many possible interested parties in the process of creating
and implementing standards. But the FSB remains a closed membership organization
that purports to make standards that apply to non-members as well as members. Some
important emerging economies, including economies that are touted as possible relo-
cation sites for global financial institutions seeking to avoid North Atlantic regulatory
burdens, do not participate in the FSB process. This poses a serious challenge to the
FSB’s legitimacy.49 As noted:
When an organization like the Basel Committee excludes a government (or
many governments), it risks being viewed as an undemocratic or unrepresenta-
tive regime imposing its will on nonparticipating (and often democratic)
......................................................................................
47. Ford (2010a, p. 471).
48. Ford (2011, p. 4).
49. The FSB has sought to respond to this challenge by establishing regional “consultative groups” that hold ad
hoc discussions with non-member countries (Financial Stability Board [2012b]).
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governments. . . . The very credibility of its standards may consequently be
undermined because of the regulatory environment in which it was created,
whatever its technocratic merits.50
Likewise, the NG approach imagines collective governance in which all viewpoints
are heard and coordinated. Yet at the FSB, although decisions are made by consensus,
in practice some members have considerably more authority than others with more
representatives in the FSB Plenary.51 At the individual committees in which important
policies are often debated and drafted, the representation of North Atlantic regulators
on FSB and Basel committees—both as committee members and committee chairs—
is still unduly large in relation to these economies’ global market share.
2. Limited public-private coordination
As described above, one of the central innovations of NG was its emphasis on new
forms of collaboration between public and private actors that would go beyond the
antagonistic relations between regulators and market participants posited by both
free market and welfare state models of state-market relations. So far, however,
this collaborative approach has not been operationalized in the FSB process. This
process has mainly engaged representatives of governments and international bureau-
cracies, and private parties participate only through more attenuated opportunities for
public comment.
This exclusion of private actors is unfortunate, because it fails to recognize the
practical authority of organizations such as the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association in constructing their own forms of international financial governance
beyond the state (Riles [2011], Brummer [2012, p. 4], and Teubner [1997]). There
are signs that the FSB recognizes this problem and plans to address it. Most recently,
the FSB began reaching out more actively to private-sector organizations and market
participants.52 Yet such initiatives remain in the embryonic stage.
3. Standards slide into rules
Another innovative aspect of NG theory was its emphasis on governance through broad
standards rather than rules. One advantage of standards, as seen in Section III, is that
they aim to encourage local experimentation and a plurality of approaches rather than
hard and fast rules that demand compliance. Another advantage of standards over rules
in financial governance in particular is that rules predominantly monitor and punish
conduct ex post, in contrast to principle-based regulation, which is more ex ante in
style. In practice, however, the FSB regime is increasingly rule-oriented rather than
standards-oriented and this leads to a number of problems. Although it speaks in the
language of standards, the FSB increasingly is creating what are functional rules.
......................................................................................
50. Brummer (2012).
51. A list of the representatives of each country is available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/
plenary.pdf.
52. For example, a “roundtable on risk disclosures by financial institutions [aimed] to encourage the private sector
to jointly take forward development of principles and of leading practice disclosures that will be relevant
and informative given current market conditions and risks.” The FSB plans to create a joint public-private
task force on risk disclosure that will engage both with market participants and with other standard-setting
national and international organizations “to develop principles for improved disclosures” (Financial Stability
Board [2012b]).
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One of the problems with rule-based governance—precisely the problemNG sought
to address—is that rules can easily be diluted or ignored altogether at the national
implementation phase and hence rules impose weighty compliance monitoring costs
on regulators. For example, Basel II was never implemented in the United States at
all and was only implemented in Europe just before the 2008 financial crisis. Despite
the fiercely committal language in FSB reports and communique´s, the FSB lacks any
formal power to hold member states to any of the agreements they have made at the
international level. This fact has led one Chinese commentator to dismiss the
organization as a “talking shop” (Ojo [2011]).
As is well documented in the context of the EU experience with NG techniques
in the context of the OMC, another problem with rules is that they encourage private
actors to “game” the system or develop other forms of resistance to the regime (Power
[1997], Dunn [2005], and Merry [2011, p. S90]). This was also the global experience
with capital adequacy standards under Basel II, where market participants devised all
kinds of financial products and accounting methods to “game” the regulatory standards.
In theory, peer review is meant to address this problem of noncompliance. Yet
in practice, peer review also has its limits. First, participation in it is still largely
voluntary in many practical respects. Although the FSB charter states that peer review
is a requirement of membership, the FSB peer review handbook acknowledges that
volunteers will be taken first and in practice to date country peer reviews have been
limited to volunteers (Financial Stability Board [2011d]):
Not only is peer review monitoring far from comprehensive, but the information
generated through monitoring is often not shared with the broader international
regulatory community or market participants. And even when information is
shared, it often goes unused due to the complex format through which it is dis-
seminated. As a result, the risk-adjusted cost of defection can be low, increasing
the likelihood of noncompliance when significant distributional tradeoﬀs arise.53
The problems the FSB is now encountering with peer review are replicated in the
EU experience with OMC as well. According to the European Commission’s own 2008
assessment of the impact of the OMC:
......................................................................................
53. Brummer (2011, pp. 263–264). Brummer’s review of the IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment Program, which
is more established and arguably more rigorous than the FSB’s own peer review process, concludes that
“despite its importance, the architecture supporting monitoring has historically been quite weak, even with
regard to the primary monitoring system—FSAP” (Brummer [2012, p. 157]). In particular, he identifies three
key problems.
(1) Participation is in practice less than compulsory and many countries do not in fact participate. This
creates an “adverse selection problem” in which those countries that choose to participate are in
practice those with the less serious regulatory problems (Brummer [2011, p. 159]).
(2) The information used in peer review is provided by member states under review and hence is open
to all kinds of bias, incompleteness, or error (Brummer [2011, p. 160]). Note that the FSB is just
beginning to attempt to address this problem in a small way by creating more uniform standards for
data collection and reporting as concerns linkages among SIFIs in particular, but this also requires
mandating that private firms collect data in certain forms and certain kinds of data they may not have
collected in the past (Financial Stability Board [2011b]).
(3) Results of peer review have not been made public suﬃciently (Brummer [2011, p. 161]). This is
arguably less of a problem in the case of the FSB, which at least releases a redacted version of each
peer review report on its website.
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Delivery on the common objectives has been too slow or insuﬃcient . . . there is
a widespread consensus that the potential of the Social OMC remains largely
unexploited, that a number of weaknesses should be corrected and that strategic
reinforcement of the method would go some way towards improving delivery on
the common objectives. The analysis points to a lack of political commitment
and visibility and a need for better horizontal policy coordination and
mainstreaming of social protection and social inclusion concerns in all relevant
policy areas.54
4. Pluralism slides into harmonization
A related innovation of the NG approach was its emphasis on regulatory pluralism
rather than a demand for a single universal regulatory standard. Although this ideal was
also central to the FSB’s mandate and reflected in the language of “standard setting”
rather than “rule making,” in practice the FSB is moving toward greater emphasis
on securing compliance with harmonized rules and practices than the promotion of
regulatory pluralism.55 Consider, for example, the following oﬃcial explanation of
the new FSB standards on SIFIs that describes a harmonization project rather than
a pluralistic project. According to then Chairman Draghi, the new standards were
designed to address gaps in legal frameworks and tools for eﬀective intervention
in failing systemic firms, including those that operate in multiple jurisdictions,
and to remove impediments under existing national law to cross-border
resolution. Their implementation will require legislative changes in
many jurisdictions.56
As one FSB report explains, likewise, peer reviews are now “focused on the
implementation and eﬀectiveness of international financial standards and of policies
agreed upon within the FSB” (Financial Stability Board [2010, p. 3]). This drift away
from original commitments to pluralism and toward greater insistence on harmonization
has been observed in the context of NG regulation in the EU also.57
5. Problems with the sociological approach
One innovation of NG, as we saw, is its emphasis on sociological rather than legal
tools for achieving outcomes. Some observers query, however, whether—in the case
of international financial regulation—a community of regulators who are collectively
committed to careful deliberation and individually susceptible to group pressure when
they fail to meet international targets is in fact so easily achieved. Verdier points out
that the fantasy of a community of cosmopolitan regulators is not borne out in practice:
......................................................................................
54. Greer (2011, p. 196), quoting European Commission (2008) 2170, p. 2.
55. As argued by Slaughter (2005, p. 59), harmonization goals are far more nationally suspect and hence to the
extent that the FSB becomes what she terms a “harmonization network” it can expect greater degrees of
domestic criticism.
56. Draghi (2011).
57. Dunn (2005) argues, for the context of EU food safety standards, that when coupled with NG “audit technolo-
gies” such as self-reporting mechanisms, this drift toward harmonized standards has unintended detrimental
eﬀects on the internal character of local institutions—leading to pressures for jurisdictions to abandon dif-
ferences and conform to a homogeneous model—that go far beyond the kinds of local change envisioned by
traditional international legal harmonization projects or indeed the defensible objectives of regulatory policy.
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“national regulators are tied to domestic constituencies by incentives and accountability
structures that are much stronger than their links to any ‘hypothetical global polity”’
(Verdier [2009, p. 115]). Brummer argues that the NG model, with its happy image of
a community of expert peers, ignores the fact that the dominant modality of interaction
is not a “coordination problem,” in which regulators share the same basic preferences
for regulatory standards, but rather competition. “Regulators, in short, do not always
share the same policy preferences. Some policy options will, for example, cost more
for some countries than for others. Due to diversity in history, culture, and custom,
countries have vastly diﬀerent starting points as far as what kinds of regulations are
already in place” (Brummer [2011, pp. 269–270]). Shapiro likewise argues:
There are a number of reasons to be agnostic if not atheistic about deliberation.
Most fundamentally, there is little reason to believe that people with substantial,
long-term, material interests in achieving a particular outcome are going to
abandon those interests and their dedication to those outcomes as sweet reason
emerges from the talk fest.58
6. Learning slides into surveillance
And these limitations to deliberation lead to another problem. One of the greatest
values of NG tools such as peer review is the opportunity they provide for comparison
and learning.59 Although proponents of NG promote peer review as a tool for reflexive
learning, in practice peer review often slips into a tool of surveillance in which par-
ticipants evaluate themselves and submit to evaluation according to how closely they
conform to a given standard and there is relatively little opportunity to deliberate about
the appropriateness of the standard in the first place. Although in theory NG supports
a plurality of regulatory approaches, often it is used more to monitor and self-monitor
according to a predetermined policy or institutional choice.
The FSB risk governance peer review questionnaire (Financial Stability Board
[2012c]) provides a good example of this problem in practice. The questionnaire
acknowledges that there is no clear international standard regarding proper procedures
for risk governance and that the purpose of the review is to evolve toward consensus
concerning a standard. Thus, it would seem to be a natural vehicle for deliberation and
consultation. However, the specific questions posed to regulators presuppose an answer
as to what the international standard for risk governance should be. For example,
the questionnaire introduces the concept of a “risk committee” as “a specialised Board
committee responsible for advising the Board on the firm’s overall current and future
risk appetite and strategy, and for overseeing senior management’s implementation
......................................................................................
58. Shapiro (2004, p. 350).
59. The opportunity for developing best practices through comparison to others is part of the underlying
self-justification of NG. As noted by de Bu´rca and Walker (2007, p. 536), NG
speaks to the close tracing of particular interests allowed by the timely adjustment of shifting
preferences in local contexts of practice, the epistemic premium of continuously developing and
refining best practice, the dignity and compliance-value of participation and negotiated settlement,
and the competitive dividend and diversity-respecting importance of the coexistence and coalition of
diﬀerentiated frameworks of regulation.
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of that strategy”—clearly one very particular possible institutional form of risk manage-
ment among all possible forms. Rather than ask about other possible institutional forms
or policy solutions that might serve similar functions in diﬀerent jurisdictions, the
questionnaire goes on to ask, “Do supervisory requirements or expectations exist
concerning the role and responsibilities of the risk committee?”—thus assuming that
such committee should exist and should be supervised. In this way, the questionnaire
becomes a tool of surveillance rather than a tool of deliberation, and a tool for pro-
moting adherence to one specific regulatory response to risk as the new harmonized
global standard rather than a tool for coordinating among pluralistic regimes.
When tools for learning become tools of surveillance, then the comparison
conducted through peer review remains relatively superficial and opportunities for
learning are lost. Equally importantly, the unexamined common sense solutions found
in jurisdictions that exercise larger influence at the FSB secretariat continue to dominate
to the exclusion of other possibilities and at a cost to the international legitimacy of
the organization as a whole. If Sabel and Simon (2006) claim that the deliberative
dimension of NG is key to overcoming the democracy deficit in administrative law
at the national and international level, then the converse is also true—a failure of
deliberation and the transformation of NG instruments into tools of surveillance
exacerbates the problems of democratic accountability many commentators see in a
process by which a small group of non-elected experts hailing disproportionately from
certain geographical areas makes international rules for the rest of the world.
7. Audit culture
Finally, although some Basel negotiators suggest that there are contexts in which NG
tools can be eﬀective means of learning and consensus building—that is, that they
can be used as opportunities to educate a wider audience of global regulators about
the particular conditions of national markets, and also as opportunities to learn more
about conditions of other markets that may impede regulatory harmonization—many
regulators suggest a degree of frustration with the volume of paperwork produced
by NG initiatives, and a concern that the time demands of these assignments do not
produce suﬃcient practical rewards.
Given the sheer volume of new governance activity, this criticism needs to be
taken seriously. In an era of seriously curtailed government budgets, time spent on
peer review, on international meetings, and on information exchange is time that is not
available for other regulatory initiatives. The FSB estimates that each member of a peer
review committee should expect to spend the full-time equivalent of approximately six
weeks on this work, and while the FSB (interestingly) does not estimate the time costs
of such activity to the members under review, one can assume it is at least comparable.
Furthermore, many of these reviews in turn make requests for information that place
demands on market participants, and these demands have also mushroomed to the point
at which risk management staﬀ in some banks claim to spend almost half of their time
responding to regulators’ requests for information—often so that such information can
in turn be passed on to international organizations.
Social scientists have begun to explore the real costs on institutional cultures of
“audit cultures” or “audit societies”—governance systems rooted principally in self-
reporting strategies. These costs include lost labor resources devoted to wasted reporting
96 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/NOVEMBER 2013
main : 2013/10/23(11:37)
Is New Governance the Ideal Architecture for Global Financial Regulation?
eﬀorts, but they also include other problems such as information overload, “anxious
preoccupation with how one is seen by others,” and an erosion of trust within institutions
(Power [1997]; see also Shore [2008])—precisely the opposite of what the FSB seeks
to achieve through NG strategies.
The reasons why such processes may begin to seem like “paperwork” rather than
true exercises in deliberation relate once again to how these tools become standardized
and institutionalized into fairly rigid models. When faced with a questionnaire that asks
questions that do not fit the local context, for example, there is little space within the
form to explain why the question is not the right one to ask in the first place. This
suggests that at a minimum more attention needs to be paid to designing a peer review
and self-monitoring process which fosters meaningful dialogue and deliberation by
making room for respondents to challenge the terms of the question or the assumptions
behind the review itself.
V. Conclusion
The attention of policymakers, market participants, and many of their interlocutors in
academia has focused, naturally enough, on the details of particular policy initiatives
of the moment without much regard for the greater sum of the regulatory parts. Yet
individual policies take shape and come to be implemented within particular
regulatory architectures.60 The predominant architecture deployed by the FSB—the NG
architecture—may have been chosen largely by default, and perhaps without suﬃcient
critical analysis or empirical study. The summary of the history of the NG approach
in Section III suggests that this lack of reflection is perhaps due to the influence of
Europeans and Americans on G20 reforms after the crisis of 2008 and culminating
in the relaunch of the FSB. In Europe and the United States, NG techniques have
generated considerable excitement in academic and policy circles from the late 1990s
up to the present.
However, recent coordination challenges surrounding financial regulation in the EU
that surfaced in the past year, together with the weaknesses of the U.S. collaborative
approach to regulation demonstrated by the financial crisis of 2008, suggest that at a
minimum this model should not be adopted without reflection. The aim of this paper
therefore, has been to initiate a debate about the range of available approaches, and the
......................................................................................
60. Pan (2010, pp. 245–247) argues that the fragility of the G20 “network” approach to financial governance
should be apparent from the last financial crisis:
International law scholars frequently noted that the international financial architecture relied to a
great extent on informal transgovernmental networks as opposed to formal international organizations
or other treaty-based mechanisms. Thus, the international financial architecture appeared to provide
convincing empirical support for such scholars’ claims about the eﬀectiveness of transgovernmental
networks in promoting regulatory cooperation among states. In fact, the international financial
architecture proved incapable of preventing or managing the causes and eﬀects of the recent financial
crisis. . . . The failure of states to provide for an international legal regime capable of conducting
prudential supervision of cross-border financial institutions proved to be one of the reasons why the
international financial architecture was unable to prevent financial instability in the US from becoming
a global financial crisis.
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strengths and weaknesses of each, in international financial regulation to be deployed
by the FSB in particular as it addresses the challenges of G-SIFIs.
Although the NG model deployed by the FSB has solid theoretical foundations
and much promise, in its application there are signs of potential pitfalls. This would
suggest that regardless of how seductive NG is in theory, we should not assume that
it is always the best approach to coordinating among interconnected but pluralistic
regulatory regimes in the international financial system without the benefit of further
research into the precise conditions in which it furthers goals of regulatory coordination
while preserving diversity and promoting legitimacy, and those in which it does not.
Thus, a preliminary hypothesis for future research emerges from this analysis:
NG mechanisms may be eﬀective in resolving some kinds of problems caused by the
interrelationship of legal regimes in a pluralistic regulatory order, but they are unlikely
to be suitable to all problems. This is, at the very least, a robust international financial
governance structure necessitates some other kinds of international legal arrangements
alongside NG mechanisms. This hypothesis merits empirical study, and also suggests
the need for debate about the full range of possible legal alternatives for a global
financial architecture. In short, the general validity of the NG model should not simply
be accepted as an untested and unchallenged article of faith.
A. Possible Avenues for Reform
Although we lack suﬃcient information about current conditions to make firm
recommendations, the research into uses of NG techniques in other international insti-
tutional contexts, together with lessons learned from the application of NG techniques
by national regulators to domestic financial markets, does suggest on a preliminary
basis that a number of reforms of or limitations on NG mechanisms might improve
their eﬃcacy. These comparative insights provide us with initial hypotheses concerning
which reforms or limitations on the NG model for the FSB might be worth pursuing.
These include the following.
1. A more inclusive process
Why do market participants remain so skeptical of the relatively modest reform
proposals embodied in Basel III? Why do domestic politicians in many countries fail to
throw their support behind international regulatory initiatives? Perhaps more attention
deserves to be paid to the form through which consensus about such reform initiatives
as capital adequacy requirements for G-SIFIs is reached in the first place (Moschella
[2010]). Market participants point out that they have very few opportunities even to
learn about negotiations at the FSB, let alone to participate in them meaningfully,
until after the agreement is complete.61 While the FSB rule-making procedure allows
for a public comment period, market participants argue that the process by which these
comments are actually taken into account is opaque and that they have little sense
of whether their comments have any impact on outcomes at all. The same is largely
true of domestic legislators. Their involvement in the international consensus is often
limited to approving or rejecting agreements negotiated by regulators after the fact.
In particular, further comparative research needs to be conducted on the consequences
......................................................................................
61. In the view of Brummer (2012, p. 198), “the G-20 and the FSB have been relative laggards regarding
accountability. Indeed, only the FSB has circulated consultative papers, and thus far has done so only rarely.”
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of variations in national processes for participating in international regulatory coordi-
nation. Some countries, including the United States, make relatively greater room for
the involvement of political branches, while the negotiation process in other countries
allows for less political involvement. Likewise, some regulators obtain feedback from
market participants through more formal notice and comment procedures while others
have greater access to informal channels. It may be that such diﬀerences correlate with
diﬀering degrees of support for international regulation in diﬀerent countries.
One of the lessons of recent innovations in international law and institutions is that
bringing a wider range of actors into the negotiation process, while time consuming and
messy, creates far greater success at the implementation stage. Those who participate in
international negotiations are more committed to seeing the results of the negotiations
bear fruit than those who do not have a chance to participate. One early example of the
use of soft law techniques to create global consensus was the United Nations World
Conference model, in which national delegations were expected to include represen-
tatives from a wide range of government and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
and in which virtually any legitimate NGO was allowed to participate as an observer
to the process (Riles [2000]). While such conferences were originally viewed as lesser
forms of international law making than traditional closed-door treaty-making negoti-
ations among state representatives, in practice they have proven to be quite successful
in generating broad and deep consensus for reform in individual nations on diﬃcult
social topics. These conferences serve important pedagogical and political functions,
in addition to their legal function.
Of course, it may not be possible to open up the financial regulatory process to this
extent. Financial governance diﬀers from governance areas such as the environment,
safety standards labor rights, human rights, and even international trade in the sense
that NGOs are by and large industry organizations with budgets that dwarf those of
national regulators, and with track records of favoring their own narrowly defined
short-term interest at the expense of larger and longer-term interests (McDonnell and
Schwarcz [2011, pp. 1643–1644]). Many national regulators express the need for a
space for discussion and coordination away from the political pressures they experi-
ence from market participants in which to construct rules that serve the wider social
good. Regulators involved in the FSB rule-making process have concerns about the
impact of openness on the ability to reach consensus, on how confidential information
can be shared, and even on potential questions of sovereignty and national security of
opening this process to a wider range of public and private actors (Jones [2010]). From
the viewpoint of many participants in G20 processes, the consensus-making process is
complicated suﬃciently at the moment by the rapid increase in member states. Con-
versely, the civil society groups that do express an interest in financial regulation seem,
from the regulators’ point of view, to engage in unhelpful populist bashing of financial
institutions, making it diﬃcult to bring them into the expert discourse (Kelly [2011]).
While these are legitimate concerns, the exclusion of the full range of interested par-
ties from the negotiations creates its own practical costs as well as challenges to the
legitimacy of the consensus reached through NG methods (Nickel [2006]).
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There is yet another reason to favor openness in the FSB process. As Ford points
out, one of the lessons of the failures of NG techniques in financial regulation prior to
the crisis of 2008 is that
the development of active contestation and deliberation within new governance
structures cannot be presumed. It must be fostered, ensured, and protected.
Reason-giving, problem identification, and careful problem-solving techniques
tend to collapse when everyone’s interests are aligned.62
This suggests that a broader and more diverse FSB membership perhaps could be a
benefit rather than a burden to better governance by helping to preserve the plurality and
diversity of views that is vital to the success of NG techniques. Ironically the premise
of NG—that through such techniques a broad base of stakeholders can and should be
enrolled in decision-making processes—has been sidelined as NG has been translated
into an international regulatory structure at the FSB.
2. Better procedural regulation of NG processes
We saw that although the ideals behind NG are often laudable, the implementation can
stray far from these ideals. We also saw that NG processes impose substantial burdens
on national regulators and on the private sector. Finally, we saw that there are increasing
concerns about the legitimacy of the authority of a small group of technocrats at the
FSB secretariat and of small, unelected subcommittees of the FSB Plenary that are
quickly becoming one of the most powerful agents of global financial regulation.
Concerns about similar processes in other international institutional contexts have
led legal scholars to ask whether this explosion of law making within international
technocratic organizations should not be subject to greater procedural safeguards, just
as the rule of law requires subjecting domestic administrative agencies to procedural
safeguards. Benedict Kingsbury and his colleagues in the Global Administrative Law
Project at the New York University School of Law have identified this “accountability
deficit” as a primary target for international legal reform across numerous policy areas.63
These safeguards could include, for example greater disclosure about the positions
national representatives take at international meetings,64 and more detailed rules
concerning the process of agreement at meetings and the process of producing and
evaluating peer review reports that would constrain civil servants’ discretion and
provide greater opportunities for input from a wider range of participants, more detailed
rules concerning standards of proof and evaluation in reaching conclusions, and oppor-
tunities for some higher or alternative level of appeal for review of FSB procedures.
The FSB handbook on peer review takes a first step in this direction. It asserts that
......................................................................................
62. Ford (2010a, p. 486).
63. These developments lead us to define global administrative law as comprising the mechanisms, principles,
practices, and supporting social understandings that promote or otherwise aﬀect the accountability of global
administrative bodies, in particular in ensuring they meet adequate standards of transparency, participation,
reasoned decision, and legality, and by providing eﬀective review of the rules and decisions they make (Krisch
and Kingsbury [2006]).
64. Slaughter (2005, pp. 222–223) argues that “public activists must seek to extend US domestic procedural
guarantees to transgovernmental activity. . . . In practice, this means requiring regulators seeking to develop
US positions at harmonization talks . . . to create a record of all their actions; this record would then be subject
to notice-and-comment rule making, allowing all interested members of the public full input.”
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“FSB peer reviews will follow objective and transparent procedures. The results of
the peer review, including any assessments on which it is based, will be published to
promote greater transparency by all member jurisdiction” (Financial Stability Board
[2011d, p. 3]). The procedures in the handbook remain quite general, however.
3. More narrowly tailored assessment tools
Comparative research in other fields suggests that NG methods are most eﬀective when
the problem they seek to address is very narrowly tailored. In such cases, peer review
can be more focused, and discussions in supervisory colleges can be more specific and
meaningful. As Greer concludes in his survey of the EU experience with OMC in the
health safety field:
In principle, this kind of more specific sectoral initiative can surmount the three
obvious problems of the OMC in health: its broad system-level focus, the
tendency for OMC work to concentrate in health ministries’ international rather
than line divisions, and the ease with which comparative health indicators can
always be discredited. By drawing on smaller networks with clearer preferences,
more specific data concerns, greater lobby support, and professional
engagement, it can create coordination and rulemaking where there were only
informal shared ideas.65
4. Greater resources for monitoring and deliberation activities
Finally, many of the problems associated with implementing NG ideals stem from lack
of adequate resources. As Ford suggests, regarding national regulation,
principles-based regulation may be more “hands-oﬀ” in its approach to the
procedural details, but this does not mean that it requires fewer regulatory
resources. Principles-based regulation may actually require intensive interaction
with firms, at least around certain issues or situations. It means having an
adequate number of staﬀ, and giving regulators the ability to obtain transparent
and reliable information from and about industry. It requires that regulators
have and use robust investigatory powers where necessary, conduct regular and
adequate compliance audits, and possess the quantitative expertise and relevant
experience to independently scrutinize information.66
Likewise, at the international level, the FSB would also need greater resources for
monitoring and deliberation activities to implement a principle-based regulatory regime.
B. Recommendation
The recommendation is to mount a cross-disciplinary, cross-jurisdictional research
project aimed at evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the FSB experience with
NG methodologies to date and at identifying the conditions under which these
methodologies are successful and those in which they require supplementation with
other methods.
......................................................................................
65. Greer (2011, p. 198).
66. Ford (2011); see also Ford (2010a).
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What is needed now is a detailed study, based upon several case studies of
particular specific regulatory or compliance initiatives, that would provide a detailed,
empirical picture of how NG methodologies are currently being used both from the
point of view of the FSB secretariat and committee structures and from the point of
view of national bureaucracies and national interest groups in several representative
jurisdictions. The focus should be on the micro-processes by which consensus over
compliance is or is not reached. Research should seek to describe the governance
process from various players’ points of view, including civil servants, domestic leg-
islatures, executive branch political leaders, and market participants to consider how
a device such as peer review might be eﬀective in generating consensus with some
constituencies but ineﬀective with others. The few studies we have suggest that the
process of reaching consensus between peer review committees and regulated states
is a far more complex process than the oﬃcial procedures suggest and that there is
some room for variation and contestation.67 The emphasis should be on the relationship
between these micro-processes and “issues of implementation, eﬀectiveness, and local
impact” across diﬀerent jurisdictions with diﬀerent market challenges and regulatory
approaches. This requires a detailed objective picture of the social and institutional pro-
cesses at work in regulatory technologies such as peer review, standards making, and
supervisory colleges. What is the experience of regulation by those who are subject to
these processes, and how does it shape their behavior? How do these practices alter or
realign existing power dynamics in the market, and among nations? Under what precise
conditions are such practices eﬀective, and when are they ineﬀective?
Since the very problem to be studied is the eﬃcacy of questionnaire and committee-
based information gathering processes, this study cannot rely entirely on such
processes. Rather, what is needed is a combination of observational and interview-
based methods. On the basis of this empirical information, it will be possible to
determine when NG techniques are the ideal governance tools in international financial
governance and when they should be supplemented with other kinds of
governance tools.
......................................................................................
67. In his study of the work of expert committees at the IMF, Harper (2000, p. 45) calls this relationship between
international and national actors “paternalism without power.”
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